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THE JURISDICTION OF COURTS
By BERNARD C. GAVITO

I
In dealing with judicial jurisdiction some confusion arises
out of the fact that a large portion of the specifically applied
law of jurisdiction is stated in terms of the substantive law
and procedural law A question of jurisdiction may be raised
while an- action is pending, or it may be raised after the
action has been disposed of and a judgment has been rendered. Thus the law-of jurisdiction may be found in the law
of "direct attack," and in the law of "collateral attack," in
the law of res judicata, of estoppel of record and in the law
of domestic and foreign judgments .generally
The reason for this is (in the field of so-called collateral
attack) that after a judgment has been rendered its validity
as a judgment depends upon whether or not it was rendered
by a court acting as a court at the time of its rendition. To
start with res judicata deals with.the substantive aspect of a
judgment; it accepts the rights and duties and facts as stated
in the judgment as the final assertion on the subject. It is
based upon the obvious policy of putting an end to controversies or possible controversies between parties. However,
it has been based also upon the assumption that policy required that the controversy be ended by a court. Thus the
pretended judgment of -a pretended court, in other words, a
judgment rendered without jurisdiction, was ineffective. The
dogma was that the question of "jurisdiction" was always
an open one. 1 What to do with that dogma is the most interesting question in the field of jurisdiction of courts. But be* Dean of the Indiana University School of Law.
This article will be continued in the June Journal.
I The Restatement of Conflict of Laws originally so stated the rule.
Sec. 490 Tentative Draft No. 2 Cf.. Sec. 450-f as finally published.
324
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fore attempting an answer it is desirable to investigate the
existing law and its background.
II
Jurisdiction of courts is sometimes classified as adjective or
procedural law But it would seem desirable to classify it
as a thing apart from either substance or procedure. In truth
it is an obvious distinct concept having little in common with
either the substantive or adjective law Substantive law deals
with the rights, powers, privileges and immunities which persons may legally enjoy and their so-called "correlatives." Adjective laws deals with the rules governing the conduct of a
judicial proceeding brought for the purpose of securing judicial recognition of some part of the substantive law as between adverse or possibly adverse parties. The law of the
jurisdiction of courts deals with the power or capacity of a
court to deal judicially with the proceeding which has been or
may be brought before it.2 Its foundation and its function
are quite separate and distinct from either the law of substance or the law of procedure.
Adjective law has to do with the functioning of a court
only after it has been determined that the court is functioning
as a court, except in the case where it is used to question
jurisdiction. There it operates on the theory that the law of
jurisdiction has already been successfully applied. But even
in the case where it is used to question jurisdiction the law of
pleading is something quite separate and distinct from the
law of jurisdiction, it merely prescribes how the question may
be presented and it has nothing to do with how it is decided.
That latter problem lies exclusively in the field of the law of
jurisdiction. It is thus well to separate it from both substantive law and adjective law and classify it as a distinct concept-the law of jurisdiction of courts. It is, of course, an
abstraction and we can well distinguish between its general
"existence" and its specific exercise.
'The jurisdictional concept includes the jurisdiction of the legislature and
the executive. Much of the law of constitutional law, and most (if not all)
of the law of the conflict of laws is a part of the law of jursdietion.
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There are other classifications or sub-classifications which
it is well to notice. The first is that which divides judicial
jurisdiction into 1, jurisdiction of the person, 2, jurisdiction
of the subject-matter.
In the abstract jurisdiction of the person means obviously
that the court in question has been granted the power to deal
with a class of persons. "In its exercise the person in question
falls within the general class and has been brought within
its authority to act in relation to his rights and duties (in their
broadest senses)
Under the earliest common law apparently the concept was
that the physical presence of the parties was necessary before a court could specifically exercise its jurisdiction in respect to them. We still follow that rule in our criminal law
today 4 Gradually the theory lost its foothold in the civil
law and jurisdiction of the person became purely conceptualistic.
In the abstract jurisdiction of the subject-matter is the preconceived power to deal with a class or classes of judicial
proceedings. In its specific exercise the question is usually
simply whether the proceeding in question falls within the
general classification, although it is possible to provide that
certain action or facts are conditions precedent to the exercise
of jurisdiction of the subject-matter. There are varying
definitions and decisions as to what constitutes "the subjectmatter of an action." Most of them arise out of attempts to
interpret and administer certain provisions of the Code of
Procedure where the phrase "subject-matter of an action" is
used on several occasions. On the whole the results reached
and the language used are not particularly helpful for the
very simple reason that the courts have never sufficiently dissected the judicial processes and functions, nor thought the
problem through. On careful analysis it does seem possible,
however, to present a rather clear concept as to what constitutes the subject-matter of an action.
Our legal system is operated upon the theory that the legal
rights and duties of all persons have a pre-conceived existence.
32 Holdsworth, A History of English Law, 92-93 (1909).
4 Due usually, of course, to a. constitutional acceptance of the rule.
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A person's rights in relation to his real estate or person he
carries around with him. If we call that person P, and the
person who interferes, or threatens to interfere with those
rights, D, we find that the courts were brought into existence
for the purpose Qf giving judicial recognition to them in favor
of P and against D. Theoretically P's judgment against D
is the right which he previously had, but which is now conclusively and finally evidenced by a court record. 5 When P
seeks the aid of a court he is asking a specific judicial recognition of an asserted "existing" right against D.
At some time in the past inevitably P and D have in fact
come together or into some relationship with each other (else
we have a moot case) There is necessarily in every judicial
proceeding a background of past events or facts. Necessarily
P's asserted right against D has that background, and although P may have many pre-conceived general legal rights,
he necessarily is presenting a specific right arising out of a
specific situation when he comes into court. Under some systems of pleading, of course, the situation is expressly asserted,
and the right only impliedly asserted, but the truth is that in
any given case he asserts both. The function of the court is
to determine the truth of those assertions. It inquires then
into two things (or a complex thing) , the asserted legal
rights of the parties under the asserted facts. The court
deals with that. That constitutes the subject-matter of an
action.6
6 Mr. Justice Cardozo has given expression to the proposition in this form:
"None the less, as in other cases of contested right, the judgment does not
create the title which it registers." In re Melrose Ave., 234 N. Y. 48, 54, 136
N. E. 235, 237 (1922). Mr. Justice Holmes has said this: "A judicial inquiry
;nvestigates, declares and enforces liabilities as they stand on present or past
facts and under laws supposed already to exist." Prentis v. Atlantic Coast
Line, 211 U. S. 210, 239 (1908). In the recent gold clause cases Chief Justice
Hughes states the theory thus: "The fact that the United States may not be
sued without its consent is a matter of procedure which does not affect the
legal and binding character of its contracts. While the Congress is under no
duty to provide remedies through courts, the contractual obligation still exists,
and, despite infirmities of procedure, remains binding upon the conscience of
the sovereign." Perry v. United States, 55 S. Ct. 432, 496 (1935).
6 The author has developed the views here expressed in more detail in an
article, "The Code Cause of Action," 30 Columbia L. Rev. 802; 6 Ind. L. J. 203,
295 (1930).
CI: Arnold, The Code "Cause of Action" Classified by United
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Jurisdiction is also divided into jurisdiction of actions in
rem and jurisdiction of actions in personam. The classification is a significant one, for the character of the process or
notice necessary in a given case depends upon it. The distinction between the two is usually stated in terms of the
results, that is, what is the theoretical character of the judgment the court will render? If the judgment is self-executing
it is said to be an action in rem, if it is not it is an action
in personam.

It is submitted that the explanation is maccurate and that
its proponents must finally give to the phrase "self-executing"
a legal content at variance with its factual content. To start
with it is never helpful to define a legal concept in terms of
its results. In fact that really denies the concept. It is of
no value whatever in the determination of a specific problem
in the future. Is there not, therefore, some test which can
be applied at the beginning, rather than at the end? It is
believed that there is, and that the only basic distinction between actions in rem and actions to personam is that in the
former the court is dealing primarily with a right in rem, and
m the latter it is dealing with a- right in personam. ("Primarily" is inserted because there are cases in which both are
involved.)
If we look at the distinction based upon the "self-executing"
character of the judgment we find many judgments in rem
which may not be self-executing in any factual sense, as for
example, partition, ejectment, replevin, mortgage foreclosure
(in a "lien theory" state), attachment and even admiralty
judgments. In each of those cases, as a matter of fact, the
plaintiff needs some additional action before he actually realizes upon his judgment.
Probably originally the theory was based upon the metaphysical notion that m an action in rem the proceedings were
against a tangible thing, over which the court had, or had
acquired, a physical control, and with which in its judgment
States Supreme Court, 19 A. B. A. J. 215 (1933), Gavit, A "Pragmatic Definition of the 'Cause of Action'," -82 U. of Pa. L. R. 129 (1933), Clark, The Cause
of Action, 82 U. of Pa. L. R 354 (1934), Uavit, The Cause of Action-A
Reply, 82 U. of Pa. L R. 695 (1934).
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it directly dealt. Under such a theory a court dealt with
"things" and not legal interests in relation to them. When
the possibility of attaching a debt or other chose in action was
admitted that theory lost its validity Under modern jurisprudence the theory has been repudiated. It is apparent that
even in afi action to quiet title to real estate, for example, the
court is really dealing only with the plaintiff's and defendant's
asserted rights in relation to the real estate, it is in no sense
dealing with the real estate in fact. 7 It is for this reason
after all that parties are as necessary to an action in rem
as they are to an action in personam.s The subject-matter of
an adtion in rem is in this respect remarkably like the subjectmatter of an action in personam, it is the asserted rights of
the parties under the asserted facts, and in both cases the
rights are equally intangible for the simple reason that both
are but mental concepts. Nor does it make a distinction to
say that in an action in rem the rights are in relation to real
estate, or other specific and tangible property, because the
action of trespass (which is in personam) really involves
rights in relation to real estate; while an action in garnishment may be in rem and be in relation to intangible property
It will be noticed, however, that in most actions in rem
the rights involved are usually primary rights, while in an
action in personam the rights are usually secondary or remedial rights. Does that form a basis for distinction? A primary right is defined as a pre-conceived legal right whose
ownership is not based upon wrongful conduct. Thus title
to property generally and the right to the performance of a
contract before breach are primary rights;9 while the right
to damages for trespass or breach of contract are secondary
7 Mr. Justice Holmes is authority for the statement that "all proceedings,
like all rights, are really against persons." Tyler v. Judges of the Court of
Registration, 175 Mass. 71, 55 N. E. 812, 51 L. R. A. 433 (1900). The preliminary sections of the American Law Institute Restatement of the Law of

Property are based upon this philosophy.
8 See the case cited supra n. 7, also Hamilton v. Brown, 161 U. S. 256
(1896), Mortimore v. Bashore, 317 Ill. 535, 148 N. E. 317 (1925), Schnebly,
Extinguishment of Contingent Future Interests by Decree and Without Compensation, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 378 (1931).
9 The first is a right in rem; the second is a right in peronam.
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rights.' 0 But the chose in action may now be the subjectmatter of an action in rem, so that the distinction is inconclusive.
If we look at the possible distinctions between the primary
right to the performance of a contract and the primary rights
(in the broad sense) which constitute the title to property
we find the clue to a solution of the difficulty The first has
been classified as a chose in action, while the latter was classified as property The first was originally property in only a
very limited sense, the latter always was "property" and
nothing but "property"
In other words the chose in action
was both theoretically and actually a limited right against a
person. There was no power of sale. The law did not recognize the other incidents of property arising from it, such as
a right to protection against wrongful invasion. Title to
property, however, was a complex thing, and was composed
of a number of rights against all persons, together with the
power of disposition and the other incidents of "title."
If it is now true that an action in rem must be against
persons also," as a practical matter there is a personal aspect
to all rights in rem, when court procedure and jurisdiction
are concerned. The old theory maintains itself, however,
and in such a case the plaintiff is asserting a right in rem
against the defendants named.
The distinction then between a primary right in rem and
a primary right in personam is whether or not the right in
question in the aspect presented for determination is against
the defendant because the right had its origin against him
solely, or is against him as a result of a larger antecedent
right with which he has come in contact. The primary right
in personam is not asserted as a property right but as a personal right; while the primary right in rem is asserted as a
property right, despite its personal character.
10 The author prefers "secondary" over "remedial" because of the confusion brought into the picture by the use of the latter. There is strictly speaking no right to a remedy; (unless it be as a matter of constitutional law) and
a person can secure judicial recognition of a primary right as easily as he can
secure judicial recognition of a secondary right (as for example in an action
to quiet title). Both are substantive and are separate and apart from either
the law of procedure or the law of jurisdiction.
11 See supra n. 8.
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On the other hand the chose in action became assignable,
the tort of interference with a contract relationship developed, it could be garnisheed. The result has been that around
the chose in action there have developed all the insignia of
"property " Those same insignia in relation to tangible property are inseparable from it, and really constitute the "title."
It is clear that the power to assign, or sell a chose in action,
as well as the rights protected by the law of torts in connection with it, now constitute a "property" or a "title." Purely
for historical reasons do we regard the chose in action as a
thing separate from its incidents, so that it remains essentially a right in personam, while a "property," despite its
personal aspects, remains essentially a bundle. of rights in rem.
The two, after all, are remarkably similar in their final legal
coiltent; but there is enough of actual, mental and historical
differences to maintain the legal distinctions between them.
We may well see the time, of course, when the distinctions
between actions in rem and actions in personam will be lost.
The problems presented by the distinctions are after all as to
where an action ought to be brought and what constitutes
reasonable notice. History, as usual, ought not to be the
exclusively determining factor.
So it is true that when we are dealing with a chose in action
as a chose in action it remains a right in personam. But when
we come to the property side of the chose in action we may
have an action in rem, because we are now dealing with a
right in rem. Theoretically there should be no more difficulty
in having an action to quiet title to a chose in action than
there is to quiet title to real estate. For the same reason we
have receivership, bankruptcy, probate or garnishment proceedings where the court deals with the property aspects of
choses. in action. The truth is that if we start back at the
beginning of those actions we find that the law under some
circumstances gives a creditor a present power of disposition
(or in older language, a right) over his debtor's property
(including his choses in action) 12 When a creditor starts
one of those proceedings he is seeking judicial recognition of
12

In the probate proceedings it is held -in trust for him by the executor or

administrator.
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that power of sale. It is a right in rem, and, therefore, we
have an action in rem.
The ultimate means of enforcement is immaterial. In a
partition suit or a probate proceeding, for example, the sale
is effected by the court itself;13 but in an attachment suit, a
garnishment proceeding, a mortgage foreclosure (in a "lien
theory" state) the sale is effected by the sheriff. 14 In either
event the judgment is a judicial recognition of the power of
sale, the action is in rem, although it is clear that the judg5
ment is in no factual sense self-executing.'
On such a basis it is unnecessary to say, for example, that
the judgment in ejectment is "self-executing," because the writ
of execution or restitution under which -the sheriff acts is "in
aid of the judgment" rather than in the enforcement of it.'16
The right asserted by the plaintiff in such an action and judicially recognized by the judgment was a right in rem (the
right to the possession of the property) and consequently
there is an action in rem, despite the now personal feature of
both the right and the action.
It is undoubtedly true that originally the law of equity
could not be brought into the common law concept of legal
rights or actions for the simple reason that the court of equity
did not operate under any pre-conception as to legal rights,
-nor did it deal with them. It dealt with the parties' consciences, and it was not until rather recent times that judges
and writers began to speak of equitable rights (in the broadest sense, again)
It is to be doubted if modern jurisprudence makes any distinction on this score between legal and
equitable rights, and it would seem highly desirable that our
theories here make no distinction. Thus we have equitable
rights, equitable conveyances and equitable torts. When, for
13 See, e.g., Heppe v. Heppe, 199 Ind. 566, 149 N. E. 890 (1925) holding
that an order for a partition sale is a "final" judgment from which an appeal
lies, and recognizing, therefore, that the sale is an enforcement of the judgment.
14 The sheriff ordinarily is not a court officer, but an executive officer. See,
Knisely v. Ham, 39 Okla. 623, 136 Pac. 427 (1913) and n. 49 L. R. A. (N. S.)
770; and Conflict of Laws Restatement (1934 Am. L. Inst.) Sec. 56.
15 The word "self-executing" of course m4y be a valid legal one, but it is
certainly misleading.
16 See, e.g., 9 R. C. L., pp. 930, 931.
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example, P sues to restrain threatened trespass he asserts
and recovers on a secondary equitable right arising out of the
equitable law of torts. When P sues for specific performance
of a contract the contract is broken in equity as it is in law,
and the plaintiff recovers on a secondary equitable right to
specific reparation for the breach of the contract. "Specific
performance" is thus something of a misnomer. Professor
Langdell was always careful to employ the phrase "specific
reparation." 17
If under modern statutes the decree operates as a conveyance it is because the law now makes the original contract
both a legal contract and an equitable conveyance of the title
to the land. P therefore asserts and gets exactly what his
contract gave him, but it is an action in rem, because he is
really asserting a right in rem.
-An action in rem, therefore, is one in which the plaintiff
asserts and is seeking judicial recognition of a right (in its
broadest sense) in rem, an action in personam is one in which
the plaintiff asserts and is seeking judicial recognition of a
right in personam. Despite the personal aspects of rights
in rem, and the property aspects of rights in personam, we
still cling to the theory that one is a right against many and
the other a right against one. Here, as is usual in the field
of jurisdiction, the historical aspect of the problem is determinative of most (and perhaps too many) cases. It is
something of a mental feat to mark the distinctions between
a right in rem and a right in personam but until the feat is
accomplished there can be no clear solution of the principal
18
problem.
17 See, A Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdiction, 1 Harv. L. Rev. 355, 358
(1888).
18 It is sometimes said that "it is impossible to conceive" of certain legal
distinctions. The proponents of such a view probably only mean that we
ought not to indulge in the conception because it is literally true that nothing
is impossible in the field of legal concepts. Here legal science is on a par with
pure mathematics. Legal concepts are the product of the imagination, -and
to paraphrase the Red Queen, with a little practice anyone should be able to
imagine at least six impossible things every morning before breakfast. Few
lawyers have difficulty in conceiving of a legal interest in an unborn contingent
remainderman; but to the untrained that is a rather difficult concept. So the
concepts surrounding the principal topic are refined, but they are far from un-
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It is possible to mark the distinction between jurisdiction
and venue in a few words. As we have seen specific jurisdiction is the capacity or power to deal with the case presented by the parties. Venue is a restraint on that capacity
or power for the benefit of the defendant. The theory is that
the court has jurisdiction but as against this defendant it
ought not to use its power. Courts normally, for example,
have jurisdiction throughout the state, but a statute may prescribe that certain actions shall be brought in certain courts.
It is often said that the law of venue is the law as to where
actions "ought to be brought;" but that same statement applies equally to the law of jurisdiction. Actions in truth ought
to be brought in conformity to both the law of jurisdiction
and the law of venue.
It is difficult in a given case to determine whether a statute
or rule designating the co-art in which a given action shall
be brought is dealing with jurisdiction or venue. The question is usually one of statutory interpretation, and the question
can best be put in this form does the statute limit the power
of the court to act as a court, or does it merely place a restraint on its admitted power? Again the courts are prone
to answer that question solely in the light of the historical
ispect of the situation.
No small measure of confusion has been brought into the
picture at this point by the common law classification of actions into local actions and transitory actions. This has been
assumed to have been a classification identical with actions
in rem and actions zn personam, or at least it has been thought
that the distinction was between jurisdiction and venue. In
truth the classification had neither basis. Originally all common law actions were begun in London, but if a trial was
finally had in a given case it usually was, held in the county
where the factual situation had developed. The reason for
that was that originally the jury was selected because of its
knowledge of the facts and it decided the issue of facts on
possible. Their ultimate utility is a question for the courts; but until they
abandon them we will have to deal with them. One could sit down and work
out an entirely different set of postulates, but the final practical result would
likely be (if he used good judgment) little different from the present one.
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its own knowledge. To get a proper jury, therefore, it was
convenient to go to the locality where the factual situation
had developed. When it was finally determined that the jury
could no longer decide the issue of fact on anything other
than the evidence given in court the reason for that practice
disappeared. Under the old rule it was necessary for the
plaintiff to make allegations as to the venue, that is, where
the factual situation in question had developed. It was a material allegation so that a proper jury might be obtained, but
when the jury no longer could decide on its own knowledge
the allegation became immaterial in some cases and the rule
developed that if the factual situation could possibly (as a
physical fact) have developed in any county the venue could
be laid by the plaintiff in any county; but if it could have possibly developed in only one county the venue could only be laid
in ihe county where it actually occurred. The first was a
transitory action, the latter a local action.' 9
Thus all actions concerning personal injuries, for breach
of contract or covenant, or concerning movable property were
transitory Some of the latter are in rein, of course. Actions
relating to land were local, and thus even an action for trespass to land was a local action although it was an action in
personam. In the local actions the allegation as to venue remained material, and the reason why a plaintiff could not
maintain an action for trespass to land in a foreign country
was because he could not make or prove a proper allegation
as to venue. The question, however, has been erroneously
20
regarded as a substantive or a jurisdictional one.
Courts have been classified as either courts of general, or
special (limited) jurisdiction. Whether or not a given court
is one or the other, or both, is a question of statutory and
constitutional interpretation. It is usual, here again, to state
the distinction in terms of its results and the quality of the
'9 Stephen, Principles of Pleading, 280-292 (1824).

20 See, Jacobus v. Colgate, 217 N. Y. 235, 111 N. E. 837 (1916) and note
44 L. P, A. (N. S.), 267. See Mr. Justice Cardozo's "explanation" of his
opinion in the Jacobus case in the subsequent case of Matter of Berkovitz v.
Arbib and Houlberg, 230 N. Y. 261, 130 N. E. 288 (1921). The truth is that
in the first case the learned justice was bitten by the bug of "realism," which
I
"error" he has since repudiated.
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judgment rendered is said to be the determining factor. So
it is often said that the judgment of a court of general jurisdiction is immune against collateral attack upon jurisdictional
grounds, whereas the judgment of a court of special or limited jurisdiction is entitled to no such immunity In the latter
case all of the facts necessary to give jurisdiction must appear
affirmatively on the record, and even then the correctness of
their determination is open to collateral inquiry
It will be asserted hereafter that the reason why the judgment of the court of general jurisdiction enjoys the exalted
status it does is because that character of court has in addition to its other jurisdiction the superimposed jurisdiction to
judicially determine finally its own and other courts' jurisdiction. On the other hand the court of special jurisdiction
usually has no such power. Ordinarily there is no indication
in the language of the statute or constitution creating the
court in question that the court has or has not been given this
additional power. It probably is true that this addition to
the power of the so-called court of general jurisdiction is
judicial legislation, which is made imperative by the necessities of the situation and the constitutional doctrine of the
separation of powers.
The necessities of the situation are these the duty to perform a judgment, rather than the original legal obligation
upon which it is based, arises out of the law of judgments,
which is substantive law The law of self-help having been
largely abolished, a person's rights in relation to his property
usually prohibit another person as an individual or as an executive officer from proceeding against his property in satisfaction of an original legal obligation until a court, acting as a
court, has judicially recognized it and recorded it in the form
of a judgment. If it is only one in form there is no duty to
perform it on the part of the supposed judgment defendant,
and his property rights are protected against its proposed enforcement by the sheriff or others. Thus logically every
judgment of any court is open to the subsequent inquiry did
the court rendering it really have actual power to render it;
is it a judgment only in form or is it also a judgment in
substance?

TURISDICTION OF COURTS

Those questions are to be answered only by a court, because they lie within the field of the judicial power as distinguished from the executive or legislative fields. We have
never put in the latter the power finally to determine the legal
validity of a judgment of a court. Accepted doctrine here
has conceded to the so-called court of general jurisdiction
the power to deal with it finally (to make a mistake concerning it), while that has denied it to the so-called court of special
or limited jurisdictron. As pointed out above that concession
is a desirable one. But the denial is not necessarily so
desirable.
Suppose for example that P has sued D in State X for
divorce. P's actual domicil in State X is a jurisdictional fact,
because only the state of domicil has jurisdiction of the
marital status. Suppose the court in State X erroneously has
decided that P was domiciled there and has rendered a decree of divorce. In a subsequent action involving the property rights of the parties theoretically the decree is void, because in fact and in law the court had no jurisdiction to render
it. The second court therefore disregards it and holds that
the parties are still married. In a third court the judgment
of both previous courts is still inconclusive and unless we concede some additional power to the second court the validity
of the first decree is still open to question. It is obvious that
some court ought to have the power to determine the question
finally; and there really is no reason why the first court cannot and ought not to be given the power as well as the second
or third court. The decision of the first court can be reviewed
on appeal, and there is always a constitutional question involved so that ultimately the question may be carried to the
Supreme Court of the United States. 2 1 It can be settled in
21 The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is a general limitation on the powers of a state to act in any capacity. Whenever a state acts
beyond its power or jurisdiction, therefore, a person is being deprived of property or liberty without due process of law. So judicial action beyond jurisdiction is always unconstitutional, and whenever the question of jurisdiction is
raised the question of due process can also be raised. "Due process requires
that the limits. of jurisdiction shall not be transgressed" per Hughes, C. J.,
Burnett v. Brooks, 288 U. S. 378, 406 (1933).
See also Old Wayne Mutual L.
Assoc. v. McDonough, 204 U. S. 8, 23 (1907).
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one case as well as in two or three, and there is every advantage, therefore, in giving to the first court the power to
determine its own jurisdiction.
A recent case decided by the United States Supreme Court
illustrates the proposition very forcibly 22 An Iowa insurance company was sued in Missouri, it appeared specially
and by proper pleadings raised the question of the jurisdiction of the court, upon the theory that the company had
never done business in the state, the court found against it;
the defendant defaulted, and judgment was rendered against
it. In an action on the Missouri judgment in Iowa the company sought to raise the question of jurisdiction again but
it was held that the first judgment was res judicata. That
can only be explained on the theory that the first court had
the power finally to determine its own jurisdiction rightly or
wrongly The practical result is excellent, of course, for it
was as easy for the defendant to have appealed from the
first judgment as from the second.
It will be noted that in that case the question of jurisdiction
was specifically presented and passed upon. What happens
if it is not so presented and passed upon, and what happens
in a default case, are discussed hereafter. The principal point
seems obvious judicial jurisdiction is finally a judicial question. Power to make a mistake concerning it is- normally
ascribed to a court of general jurisdiction, but not to a court
of special jurisdiction. Defining those courts in terms of that
power or the lack of it is merely stating a result. It can only
be said that as to whether or not a court is one or the other
properly is a question of a construction of the legislation or
constitution creating it. But it is to be noted again that m
the usual case the power really seems to arise out of a judicial doctrine rather than any actual and specific grant of
power in the first instance. For that reason there is little
which stands in the way of a judicial reclassification of most
courts into the category of courts of general jurisdiction.
In the field of jurisdiction of courts the historical analogies
are usually inapplicable, although much confusion has resulted
22 Baldwin

v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U. S. 522 (1931).
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because they have nevertheless been applied. The only court
6f general jurisdiction in England until the nineteenth century was the Court of Equity The Common Law Courts
were all courts of extremely special jurisdiction. Owing to
the law of the original writ the court in truth had jurisdiction
only as io the cause of action and parties referred to it by
the writ. 23 If the writ authorized the court to try an action
of trespass q.c.f between P and D the only jurisdiction the
court had was to try that action. Much of the narrowness
of the substantive portion of the common law is the direct
result of this law of jurisdiction. The theory was that the
administration of justice was a royal prerogative and it was
not until the reorganization of the court system in England
in 1875 that it can fairly be said that theoretically the judicial
function took its place in government as a thing separate and
24
apart from the King.
Until that time except as to the Court of Equty25 no court
was established with what we would today call general jurisdiction. The King dealt out jurisdiction piecemeal by a specfic delegation of power in each case through the medium of
the original writ. It is true that the actual issuance of the
writ was early dispensed with but the theory of a jurisdiction
26
based upon it continued.
Most of the Common Law analogies here, therefore, are
false. The law of the original writ never obtained in this
country after the revolution, and courts were and are an integral part of government rather than an agency of a sovereign power in the old sense. The ordinary trial courts in
this country have always been given a very general grant of
power. Thus in this particular field it is patent that Common
Law decisions on the subject of res judicata and jurisdiction
of courts may not be applicable.
23 Sutton, Personal Actions at Common Law, 32 (1929).

24 Although apparently the old theory prevailed for some time. Thus it
was held that the King could not appear as a witness in the King's Court.
See, Walker-Smith, Lord Reading and His Cases (1934), 266. Although this
general proposition seems to have been definitely repudiated to the extent that
a proper judgment might be rendered against The Crown. Ibid. 350.
25 Clark, Pnnciples of Equity, Secs. 7 8 (1919), Cook, Cases on Equity 1-2
(1926).
26 Sutton, Personal Actions at Common Law, 43 (1929).
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Common Law courts were classified as courts of record
and courts not of record. The distinction is today apparently
without any practical significance (other than a procedural
one), but it is perhaps worthwhile to point out what the distinction was and why it no longer has importance. All of
the King's Courts were courts of record, and the reason was
not primarily that they kept a record of their proceedings,
but because when they spoke they spoke as agents of the
King; it was (in theory) the King who was speaking. What
was said could not be successfully disputed, because the King's
word was Truth.2 7 The result was that a decree or judgment
by a court of record could not be questioned in subsequent
proceedings, it remained the Truth as to the controversy between the parties and their rights and duties. In modern
language we would describe the result under the doctrine of
res judicata, although it is 6bviously a different concept. The
basis of the doctrine of res judicata is a well founded public
policy against the relitigation of a controversy between the
parties which has once been decided by an impartial tribunal
on the merits. The judgment becomes the right between the
parties. The basis of the finality of a judgment of a court
of record, as such, was the policy against allowing anyone
to dispute the King's word, which is quite a different propo.sition. It arose not out of the law of judgments but out of
the law of contempt.
The Anglo-Saxon courts of the people were therefore not
courts of record, and until the doctrine of res judicata encom28
passed their judgments their action was in no sense final.

Our inferior courts have been thought to be direct descendants
of those courts and have usually been held not to be courts
of record. 29 But the doctrine of res judicata now makes their
judgments conclusive.
Originally the principal distinction had practical consequences. The judgment of a court of record was conclusive
and the proper remedy upon it was Debt. 30
27
28
29
30

3 Blackstone's Comm. 24.
Ibzd. 25.
15 C. J. 720, 721.
Walker v. Witter, K. B., 1"Douglas 1 (1778).

The judgment
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of a court not of record was not conclusive, and the proper
remedy originally was only Assumpsit, although Debt later
would lie despite the uncertainty in the amount.31 Today
those distinctions are immaterial. The doctrine of res Judicata and the full faith and credit clause make the matter as
final as the former, and Debt would be a proper remedy 32
Except for some confusion which arises out of a failure to
recognize the real distinctions involved the classification of
courts as courts of record and those not of record is therefore today of no practical consequence. In this country since
the Revolution we have had no King's courts, the justice of
the peace and other lower courts derive their power from
the same source as the superior courts, and there is actually
no basis for any division into courts of record and courts not
of record in the original sense of those terms. Even if we
make the distinction and base it upon the historical analogies
it is meaningless, for today the doctrine of res judicata is
much broader than estoppel of record or merger, and the
judgment of a court not of record is as conclusive as is that
of a court of record.3 3 Usually, it is true, the court not of
record is also a court of limited or special jurisdiction, so that
its judgment is subject to attack on jurisdictional grounds;34
but that consequence is quite apart from the distinction between courts of record and those not of record.
It is quite obvious that estoppel of record, merger and res
judicata are quite different and distinct concepts, based upon
divergent theories although up to a point their results are the
same. Just when res judicata became a defense although the
situation presented was not encompassed by the doctrine of
estoppel of record or merger it is impossible to tell. It is
commonly said that res judicata owes its real birth to the
Duchess of Kingston's Case35 decided in 1776. On the other
31 Ibid.
32 Andrews v. Montgomery, 19 Johns (N. Y.) 162 (1821), Cole v. Driskell,
Being also a court of special jurisdiction 'the
1 Blackford (Ind.) 16 (1818).
record must bq made to show jurisdiction on its face, and the burden of proof
on the subject is on the plaintiff.
33 Ibid.
34 See supra n. 32.
5 20 Howell; St. T. 478, 3 Smith, Leading Cases, 1898.
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hand it seems impossible to ascertain just when the rigor of
the rule of estoppel by record and merger abated to allow
collateral attack upon a judgment on jurisdictional grounds.
Undoubtedly the Common Law rule was that the record was
absolutely conclusive, and that it was only for defects apparent upon the face of the record that a judgment could be
attacked collaterally 86
Today we rationalize that result (where the result still
follows) upon the theory that the first court had power to
determine finally its own jurisdiction. The law of estoppel of
record rationalized it upon the theory that the King's word
was Truth or that the original obligation was merged in
the judgment. Now we sometimes allow the truth of a record
to be disputed, but when that development took place it is
impossible to tell. The essential point is that the development
has taken place but the old theory of estoppel of record is
often resurrected and used to bring confusion into the present
day results. We would do well to abandon the concept entirely for res judicata can explain any result which it is desirable to reach without the confusing historical, but inapplicable, doctrine of estoppel of record.
The same thing is true as to merger. It never did explain
the results where a plaintiff was defeated. It does not now
operate where there was a lack of jurisdiction. It was not
applied as to foreign judgments although in a proper case the
judgment was accepted as evidence of an obligation. Under
the Federal Constitution it becomes "conclusive" evidence,
so that today "merger" is largely a procedural problem, must
the plaintiff sue upon his judgment or his original cause of
action and prove the latter by his judgment ?37
It will be seen from the foregoing that res judicata involves
two distinct situations. In the first, and most commonly
accepted sense, res judicata is a principle of substantive law;
it makes a valid judgment "the right" between the parties
38
and their privies.
36 This is old learning. The best summary of it will be found in Herman,
The Law of Estoppel and Res Judicata, Secs. 30, 31 (1886).
87 See Sec. 451, Restatement of Conflict of Laws (1934, Am. L. Inst.).
38 It is outside of the province of this article to discuss the law on this
phase of res judicata. The recent significant developments here have been
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In the second sense res judicata has a bearing on the problem as to whether or not a valid judgment has been created.
Has there been also a valid decision on the jurisdictional
questions involved? Here res judicata has to do with the
concept of jurisdiction. It is involved also in the field of the
doctrine of the supremacy of the courts. Is a valid judgment
res judicata as against the legislature and the executive ? Here
it deals with constitutional jurisdiction.
Thus the powers of a court must be investigated in relation, first, to persons, second, to other courts, and third, to
other governmental agencies. It seems desirable to investigate the last situation first.
III
As to the Federal Government the constitutional doctrine
of the separation of powers arises out of a broad interpretation of the Federal Constitution, there is no express provision
on the subject. 39

40
In some states the same situation exists

while in most states the matter is covered by express language. 41 In this connection the doctrine may be stated
pointed out by the present author in the articles cited supra, n. 6. See also
See. 451, Restatement of Conflict of Laws (1934 Am. L. Inst.).
39 3 Willoughby, The Constitutional Law of the United States (2nd ed.
1929) Sec. 1060.
40 Delaware, Kansas, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Washington and Wisconsin. See: Reybold v. Dodd, 1 Harr. 401 (Dela. 1834),
Hanson v. Grattan, 84 Kan. 843, 115 Pac. 646, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 240 (1911),
Gutlag v. Shatzkin, 230 N. Y. 647, 130 N. E. 929 (1920), Klein v-. Hutton,
49 N. D. 248, 191 N. W 485 (1922), State v. Brough, 33 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 257
(1912), Penn. R. v. Philadelphia County, 220 Pa. 100, 68 A. 676, 15 L. R, A.
(N. S.) 108 (1908), In re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 P 1152 (1918), Thoe v.
Chicago, M. & St. P Ry., 181 Wis. 456, 195 N. W 407, 29 A. L. R. 1280 (1923).
41 Alabama, Const. Sec. 42; Arizona, Const. Art. III, Arkansas, Const.
Art. IV, California, Const. Art. III, Colorado, Const. Art. III, Connecticut,
Const. Art. II, Florida, Const. Art. II, Georgia, Const. Art. I, par. 231, Idaho,
Const. Art. II, Illinois, Const. Art. III, Indiana, Const. Art. III, Iowa, Const.
Art. III;Sec. 1, Kentucky, Const., Sec. 27, Louisiana, Const. Art. 16, 17, Maine,
Const. Art. III, Maryland, Const. Art. VIII, Massachusetts, Const. Art. XXX,
Michigan, Const. Art. IV, Minnesota, Const. Art. III, Mississippi, Const. Art.
I, Missouri, Const. Art. III, Montana, Const. Art. IV, Nebraska, Const. Art.
II, Nevada, Const. Art. III, New Hampshire, Const. Art. 37; New Jersey,
Const. Art. III, New Mexico, Const. Art.,III, North Carolina, Const. Art. 1,
Sec. 8; Oklahoma, Const. Art. IV, Oregon, Const. Art. III, Rhode Island, Const.
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broadly to be that a court may not exercise any power which
is not a judicial power, nor may any other department of
government exercise a judicial power. The constitutional
standard here is a jurisdictional one, for it is a limitation
on power. Distinctions must be made therefore between the
judicial, the legislative and the executive functions.
It is usually said that the executive function is the enforcement of the law, the legislative function is the making of the
law; the judicial function is the application of the law and
the settlement of controversies over law and fact. Those
statements at best are rather meaningless generalizations.
All of them are inaccurate to a very large extent. Thus,
although ordinarily the enforcement of the law is an executive
function, there are a goodly number of cases where the courts
enforce the law For example in those actions in rem, as
in partition, receivership, bankruptcy, and probate, where the
court sells property and distributes the proceeds through its
own officers the courts are actually enforcing the power of
sale asserted by the plaintiff or the creditors. 4 2 In those
cases the executive takes no part in the proceedings, except
when he acts as sheriff or marshal in summoning parties, or
is specifically called in by the court to assist in contempt or
similar proceedings.
On the other hand there are a number of cases where the
executive both applies law and determines controversies. A
sheriff, for example, may be called upon in the levy of a writ
of execution to decide whether certain property is owned by
the judgment defendant or by X and to determine the controversy between them. Whichever way he acts is the result
of an application of his understanding of the law and the
Iicts. City, county, state and federal executive and adminisIrt. III, South Carolina, Const. Art. I, Sec. 14, South Dakota, Const. Art. II,
Tennessee, Const. Art. II, Secs. 1, 2; Texas, Const. Art. II, Utah, Const. Art.
V, Vermont, Const., Chap. II, Sec. 5, Virginia, Const. Art. III, West Virginia,
Const. Art. V, Wyoming, Const. Art. II.
42 At least if we take the language of the cases at their face value the
commissioner, the receiver, the trustee in bankruptcy and the administrator or
executor is each an officer of the court and not an executive officer. All desirable results could follow if we called them executive officers, but no reason is
perceived why the language ot the courts must not be taken at its face value.
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trative officials "allow" and "disallow" claims as a regular
part of their business. And, of course, the whole field of
Administrative Law gives the lie to the general proposition
that the application of the law and the determination of controversies is exclusively a judicial function. In truth in executing the law the executive invariably acts upon a conscious or
unconscious decision as to what the law is and what the
facts are.
The only possible distinction here involves another element;
an executive or administrative decision on the law and" the
facts is not, as an original proposition,4 3 conclusive on the
parties, while some judicial decisions on the law and
44
facts are.
The general distinction between the legislative and judicial
functions is obviously non-existent. Both the courts and the
legislature "make" law A Common Law theory of natural
law has few (and deserves no) adherents. In the sense that
there actually exist certain true rules and principles as to human conduct the concept of a pre-existent Common Law is
justly in disrepute. But as suggested above it is possible and
has been thought desirable for the courts to operate upon the
basis of a pre-existent Common Law as a purely conceptualistic
or postulational science. Quite obviously the rules and principles announced by the courts are made by the courts, and
under the doctrine of stare decisis they are made for the purpose of operating to control future conduct. And they do so
operate. The dogma that the courts do not make -law is
either based upon a metaphysical philosophy of natural law,
or it is based upon a conscious fiction employed to deceive
the public.
Nor is it true that the courts deal with specific cases and
the legislature with general situation, that the court's action
is as to the present or past while the legislature's action is
always as to the future. In the absence of constitutional
limitafions against special or retroactive legislation it is within
43 Prior to the time when a judicial review is cut off by a statute of limitations of some sort, or a similar limitation in the law or equity or appellate
jurisdiction.
44 All could- be, but there are courts which are not given complete power.
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the legislative function to enact a rule for a specific case, or
to enact a civil law having retroactive effect. In the earlier
legal history of this country such legislative acts were frequent
and they were upheld unless they impaired the obligation of
a contract, or were ex post facto announcements in the field of
criminal law
The Federal Constitution does not impose the doctrine of
the separation of powers upon the several states. 4 5 The provision against ex post facto state legislation applies only to
criminal or forfeiture laws. 4 6 The only clause of the Federal
Constitution which originally prohibited retroactive or special civil state legislation was the clause against the Impairment of the obligations of a contract.4 7 There has always
been respectable authority for the proposition that such legislation did not violate the provisions in state constitutions
48
declaring the separation of powers.
Despite the force of the position announced in Holman v.
Bank of Norfolk,49 and similar cases, there developed a controlling judicial distaste for special and retroactive substantive
legislation which culminated in repeated pronouncements that
such legislation was an unjustifiable invasion of the judicial
function. 50 Many states now have adopted specific constitu45 Satterlee v. Matthewson, 27 U. S. 380 (1829).

46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
See also, Holman v. Bank of Norfolk, 1Z Ala. 369 (1847) and
Merrill v. Sherbourne, infra n. 48.
48 Cf: Holman v. Bank of Norfolk, supra n. 47 and Merrill v. Sherbourne,
1 N. H. 199 (1818). See also: Ogden v. Witherspoon, Fed. Case No. 10, 461
(1802), McLeod v. Burroughs, 9 Ga. 213 (1851), Salters v. Tobias, 3 Paige
(N. Y.) 338 (1832), Stewart v. Griffith, 33 Mo. 13, 82 A. D. 148 (1862), Watkins v. Holman, 41 U. S. 25 (1842), Norris v. Clymer, 2 Pa. St. 277 (1845),
Edwards v. Pope, 4 Ill. 465 (1842), State v. Town of Union, 33 N. J. L. 350
(1869), Jnhnson v. County of Wells, 107 Ind. 15, 8 N. E. 1 (1886).
49 See supra n. 47.
50 Ogden v. Witherspoon, Fed. Case No. 10, 461 (1802), Regents of U. of
Md. v. Williams, 9 Gill. and J. 365, 31 Am. Dec. (Md. 1838), Lambertson v.
Hogan, 2 Pa. St. 22 (1845), Commonwealth v. New Bedford Bridge, 68 Mass.
339 (1854), Barnes v. Barnes, 53 N. C. 333 (1861), Greenough v. Greenough,
11 Pa. St. 489, 51 Am. Dec. 567 (1849), Grim v. Weissenberg School District,
57 Pa. St. 433, 93 Am. Dec. 237 (1868) (dictum), James v. State, 45 Tex.
Cr. R. 592, 78 S. W 951 (1904), Lindsay v. United States Savings and Loan
Co., 120 Ala. 156, 24 So. 171, 42 L. R. A. 783 (1898), Bridgeport Public Library
v. Burroughs Home, 85 Conn. 309, 82 A. 582 (1912), Tillman v. Tillman, 84
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tional provisions prohibiting special and retroactive legislation, but even in the absence of such additions to a state constitution this legislative practice is effectively terminated in
so far as it unreasonably interferes with "vested rights" by
the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution.5 ' That clause is a
limitation upon the legislative power, however, and is not the
grant of additional judicial power; it is a protection to the
individual and not to the courts. A case today involving special or retroactive substantive legislation might properly-be
decided under the Fourteenth Amendment in any event and
not under the doctrine of the separation of powers.
The result is that because of the Fourteenth Amendment a
state legislature must now normally enact a law which is both
general and future in its application. But except as modified
by the Fourteenth Amendment, the clause against ex post facto
criminal legislation and the clause against legislation impairing the obligation of contract the legislative power in its field
seems supreme. Outside of those limitations it seems competent for the legislature to change the Common Law,5 2 or
to promulgate any rule it sees fit.53 A few expressions or
decisions to the contrary should be labelled erroneous. 54 The
S. C. 552, 66 S.E. 1049, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 781 (1910), Flint and F. Plank Rd.
Co. v. Woodhull, 25 Mich. 99, 12 Am. Rep. 233 (1872), State v. Carr, 129 Ind.
44, 28 N. E. 88 (1891), City of New Orleans v. Louisiana Mut. Ins. Co., 26 La.
Ann. 499 (1874), People v. The Board of Supervisors of New York, 16 N. Y.
424 (1857), McLeod v. Burroughs, 9 Ga. 213 (1851), Weisberg v. Weisberg,
112 App. Div. 231, 98 N. Y. S. 260 (1906), Macartney v. Shipherd, 60 Ore.
133, 117 P 814, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 1257 (1911), United States v. Salberg, 287
F 208 (D. C. Ohio, 1923).
51 Willoughby, Constitution of the United States (2nd ed. 1929) Sec. 1117
(due process), ibid., Sec. 1267 et seq. (equal protection).
52 Silver v. Silver, 280 U. S. 117 (1929), State v. Noyes, 30 N. H. 279
(1855) , People ex rel. v. Caparbo, 135 Misc. Rep. 151, 238 N. Y. S. 197 (1930).
Innumerable cases of course by implication sustain this proposition.
53 A state legislature may provide for the submission of the question of the
repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment to a popular election. People ex rel.
Peaks v. Voorhis, 243 N. Y. 420, 153 N. E. 854- (1926). In the case cited the
court said: "Except for such restrictions (in the constitutions) the legislative
power granted to the legislature is plenary and the power includes the right
to enact the statute under consideration."
54 James v. State, 45 Tex. Cr. t.592, 78 S. W 951 (1904). In this case
the court said: "It is insisted that, althoughthils may have been the law prior
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matter is summed up in the common expression that the wisdom of legislation is not a judicial question. 55 A little reflection demonstrates, therefore, that any, general definition of
the legislative and judicial functions in terms of the power
"to make law" is meaningless and inaccurate. Each includes
the power to make law, although in a large field it must be
conceded that when the legislature acts its pronouncement is
controlling. About all that can be said truthfully on the subject is that both the legislature and the court have power to
"make law" but the legislature has power to supercede judicial law
Upon further investigation here it will be found that a disturbing factor is the doctrine of the Supremacy of the Courts.
Whether this doctrine is a part of the doctrine of the Separation of Powers or a separate doctrine is immaterial. The
doctrine of the Separation of Powers allocates the power of
the three departments of government into three mutually
exclusive categories. The doctrine of the Supremacy of the
Courts concedes to the courts to the exclusion of the legislature or executive the power of finally deciding whether the
doctrine of the Separation of Powers has been violated. It
is the most significant American contribution to the philosophy
of government. Most countries allocate governmental functions to an executive, a legislative and a judicial department,
but being equal in power, each decides its own limitations,
the restraints imposed by the doctrine of the separation of
powers are ultimately self-executed, if they are observed.
to the act of the 27th legislature (p. 262) the effect of that enactment was to
change the rule. We reply that it is not competent for the legislature to define
a sale and fix its locus, regardless of the known rules of law, which authorize
parties to make their own contracts, making the place of the sale depend on
the place where the property is transferred and titlE passed. Much less is it
competent for the legislature to reverse the decisions of the court upon questions
of this character." See also, cases cited supra n. 50.
55 See, e.g., Townsend v. State, 147 Ind. 624, 47 N. E. 19, 37 L. R. A. 294,
62 A. S. R. 477 (1897).
The general expression may be accurate enough if
it be conceded that "wisdom" and "reasonableness" are different concepts. The
"reasonableness" of legislative action is always an open question under the due
process clauses. See Willoughby, Constitution of the United States (2nd ed.
1929) Sec. 1168 et seq.
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Since the case of Marbury v. Madison5 6 it has been accepted doctrine in this country, however, that finally the question of constitutional jurisdiction is exclusively a judicial question, and thus it is that a constitutional question (which is
usually a jursdictional one) is always open. 57 There are, of
course, courts which have no power to pass on constitutional
questions.5 8 Those situations do not detract from the general
561 Cranch. 137 (1803).
57Belote v. Coffman, 117 Ark. 352, 175 S. W 37 (1915), Kilbourn v.
Thompson, 103 U. S. 168 (1880), McNealy v. Gregory, 13 Fla. 417 (1870),
Dickerson v. Acosta, 15 Fla. 614 (1876), Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y.
378 (1856), Grim v. Weissenberg School Dist., 57 Pa. St. 433, 98 Am. Dec. 237
(1868), Chase v. United States, 222 F 593, 138 C. C. A. 117 (C. C. A. Neb.
1915), State v. Maine Cent. R., 77 N. H. 425, 92 A. 837 (1914), McClure v.
Nye, 22 Cal. App. 248, 133 P 1145 (1913), Pennsylvania R. v. Philadelphia
Co., 220 Pa. 100, 68 A. 676, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 108 (1908), State v. Vincent,
Tex. 217 S. W 402, 235 S. W 1084 (1921), City of Richmond v. Carneal, 129
Va. 388, 106 S. E. 403, 14 A. L. R. 1341 (1921), State v. Superior Court of
Lincoln County, 119 Wash. 406, 205 P 1051 (1922) , New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 42 F (2nd) 913 (D. C. Okla. 1930), Householder v. City of Kansas,
83 Mo. 488 (1884), State v. McGrath, 95 Mo. 193, 8 S. W 425 (1888), Dayton
Mining Co. v. Seawell, 11 Nev. 394 (1876), Powell v. State, 17 Tex. App. 345
(1884), Bartlett v. State, 73 Oh. St. 54, 75 N. E. 939 (1905), State v. Spears
(Tenn.), 53 S. W 247 (1899), Tisdale v. Scarborough, 99 S. C. 377, 83 S. E.
594 (1914), Malone v. Williams, 118 Tenn. 390, 103 S. W 798, 121 A. S. R.
1002 (1907), Baird v. Burke Co., 53 N. D. 140, 205 N. W 17 (1925), State v.
Police Court of City of Bozeman, 68 Mont. 435, 219 P. 810 (1923), Blalock v.
Miller, 175 Ark. 98, 298 S. W 995 (1927), State ex rel. Dawson v. Falkenhamer, 321 Mo. 1042, 15 S. W (2nd) 342 (1929), Calhoun v. McLendon, 42
Ga. 405 (1871).
The common expression that the question of just compensation in eminent
domain proceedings is a judicial and not a legislative question is simply a
statement of the same proposition in specific terms. The constitutions require
"just compensation," so that legislative, executive or judicial power is limited
to a taking of property upon that condition. The condition is a jurisdictional
one and the courts only can finally determine whether or not it has been complied with. See, e.g., In re. Forty-Second Street Spur of Manhattan Ry., 216
N. Y. S. 2, 126 Misc. 879 (1926), Birmingham Drainage District v. Chicago,
B. & Q. R., 274 Mo. 140, 202 S.W 404 (1918), Chapman v. City of Hood River,
100 Or. 43, 196 P 467 (1921), Norfolk & W Ry. v. Nottingham & Wrenn,
139 Va. 748, 124 S. E. 398 (1924), Rich v. Chicago, 59 Ill. 286 (1871). Cf. In
re. Yost, 17 Pa. St. 524 (1851). The cases cited above are simply samples;
the cases asserting the doctrine, usually only by implication, are innumerable.
58 The ordinary trial court would normally be compelled to decide a question of constitutional law properly presented for decision. But it sometimes
happens that in states having more than one court of appeals the power to
pass on questions of constitutional law is, granted to one and withheld from
the other, simply as a means of dividing up the work of the courts.
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proposition, for they are a result of a failure or refusal to
grant to some courts complete judicial power, rather than a
limitation upon the concept of judicial power as such.
Thus a court may determine whether a legislature has legislated or has, for example, acted judicially, and therefore in
one sense judicial power Is always superior to legislative
power. But the supremacy is on the power to decide constitutional jurisdiction, not the power to supercede a valid legislative function.
In the light of this additional doctrine it is worth while to
investigate some of the more usual situations where the question of the dividing line between judicial, legislative and executive power has been presented for decision.

